NATO demands higher readiness and faster force generation. Training infrastructure does not scale accordingly. Limited access, low frequency, and insufficient cognitive load exposure create a structural gap.
As complexity increases, performance is defined by decision-making under pressure and spatial understanding, not physical preparation alone. This is where immersive solutions start to move the needle.
If the physical component is easier to train, why are most training systems still built around it?
Operational readiness is often discussed as if it is the direct result of training volume. More range time. More exercises. More repetitions. But volume is only part of the equation. The deeper issue is structural.
Training systems that intend to prepare warfighter for operational reality are still heavily tied to infrastructure, instructor availability, scheduling, and access to facilities.
That works in times of peace as long as time, space, and logistics are stable. Under real operational pressure, those assumptions break down. Training becomes episodic instead of continuous. Units prepare in isolated blocks, operational scenarios are rare, and stress exposure or other aspects that will make operational reality complex, are ignored.
As Dr. Fabio Ibrahim, scientific research officer at Helmut Schmidt University and Captain in the German Air Force, put it: “The hardware, such as the body and also cognitive capacity is easier to train. The software, that means decision making and cognitive agility and resilience, is the hard part.”
That distinction matters. Physical performance is visible, measurable, and already deeply embedded in training culture.
Cognitive performance is less obvious, but often more decisive. Decision-making, prioritization, spatial understanding, and pattern recognition determine whether operators can act effectively under pressure. A trained brain, and shared mental models reduce cognitive load, and free capacities for dealing with operational reality.
These are not secondary skills.
They are central to mission execution in environments that are becoming increasingly complex. Immersive training and planning addresses the last, but not least, line of defense: the human warfighter and his or her cognition.
Traditional training does not always serve the cognitive demands well. . Ibrahim described the problem directly: “Training facilities are scarce. Units even fight for slots on the shooting range. Repetition under relevant cognitive conditions is hard to achieve.” That is not a minor inconvenience. It is a the bottleneck for effective force generation.
This is where the RE-liON Operator Kit becomes relevant. Not as a substitute for live training, and not because immersion is fashionable, but because it changes access, repetition, and cognitive exposure. It allows units to train more frequently, closer to the operator, and with greater control over scenario design, time pressure, and decision demands.
The Relevance for High Stake Tasks
“In our study the decision-making score in VR was significantly higher than in the desktop condition.”, so Ibrahim.
The evidence behind that is increasingly difficult to ignore. In comparative research on decision-making, VR users outperformed desktop users with a very large effect size in overall decision-making performance (Cohen’s d = 1.54).
In operational terms, that means fewer incorrect decisions under pressure. Routes are chosen with a clearer understanding of exposure. Positions are assessed based on what is actually relevant, not what is assumed.
Decision speed also improved substantially (d = 1.09).
This is not about reacting faster for the sake of speed. It means reducing hesitation at critical moments. Faster decisions shorten exposure time, accelerate movement, and maintain initiative during dynamic situations.
The accuracy of resource allocation (d = 0.64) and the quality of prioritization (d = 0.71) also improved.
On mission level, this translates into assigning attention, time, and assets where they matter most. Less focus on low-risk elements. Fewer missed high-risk threats. Better sequencing of actions under pressure.
Spatial understanding of the operational picture showed a very strong relationship with VR conditions (r = 0.74).
That affects how operators read terrain, interiors, and movement paths. It improves orientation, reduces navigation errors, and supports coordinated movement in complex environments such as urban or multi-level structures.
Even more important, performance improved under higher perceived time pressure, without negative effects on outcomes.
This is where the difference becomes critical. Missions do not fail because conditions are calm. They fail when pressure increases and cognitive load exceeds what has been trained. Maintaining decision quality under stress directly impacts survivability and mission success.
With a 54% improvement in decision-making performance (d = 1.54), the impact is structural, not incremental.
What drives that gain is also important. It is not “immersion hype.” The improvement is not explained by presence alone, nor by subjective task load. The stronger mechanism appears to be better spatial information processing. Put simply: operators understand terrain, layout, relationships, and sequencing better, and that improves judgment.
That also aligns with one of the valuable tactical findings from CQB-related research. “Eye movement was the strongest indicator of CQB expertise.” Expertise was not only about moving faster. It was about looking at the right things in the right order.
That is a meaningful insight for both training design and measurement, when we train for high stake tasks and the outcome matters.
Operational Reality
The strategic implication is straightforward. If readiness is to be sustained, cognitive skills must be trained with greater frequency and under more relevant conditions.
If training infrastructure remains scarce, capability has to move closer to the operator. Distributed, immersive training will not replace live exercises. But it can close the gap where readiness is currently lost: between sessions, under bottlenecks, and in the cognitive domain.
RE-liON’s solution matter because operational environments are becoming more complex.
Solutions that target lethality, and dominating irregular warfare have to put cognitive performance in the focus, and serve real operational demands.
This article was reviewed by Dr Fabio Ibrahim, Scientific Research Officer of the German Navy
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